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INTUITIONISTIC MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC
JOAN RAND MOSCHOVAKIS AND GARYFALLIA VAFEIADOU
The first seeds of mathematical intuitionism germinated in Europe over a century
ago in the constructive tendencies of Borel, Baire, Lebesgue, Poincare´, Kronecker
and others. The flowering was the work of one man, Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer,
who taught mathematics at the University of Amsterdam from 1909 until 1951. By
proving powerful theorems on topological invariants and fixed points of continuous
mappings, Brouwer quickly built a mathematical reputation strong enough to sup-
port his revolutionary ideas about the nature of mathematical activity. These ideas
influenced Hilbert and Go¨del1 and established intuitionistic logic and mathematics
as subjects worthy of independent study.
Our aim is to describe the development of Brouwer’s intuitionism, from his re-
jection of the classical law of excluded middle to his controversial theory of the
continuum, with fundamental consequences for logic and mathematics. We borrow
Kleene’s formal axiomatic systems (incorporating earlier attempts by Kolmogorov,
Glivenko, Heyting and Peano) for intuitionistic logic and arithmetic as subtheo-
ries of the corresponding classical theories, and sketch his use of go¨del numbers
of recursive functions to realize sentences of intuitionistic arithmetic including a
form of Church’s Thesis. Finally, we present Kleene and Vesley’s axiomatic treat-
ment of Brouwer’s continuum, with the function-realizability interpretation which
establishes its consistency.
1. Brouwer’s Early Philosophy
In 1907 L. E. J. Brouwer published (in Dutch) his doctoral dissertation, whose
title can be translated “On the Foundations of Mathematics.”2 This remarkable
manifesto, with its heterodox views on mathematics, logic and language, critically
examined and found fault with every major mathematical philosophy of the time.
While Brouwer was aware of the work of the French intuitionist Poincare´ and of
Borel’s constructive approach to the theory of sets, it was not in his nature to be a
follower. In his 1912 inaugural address at the University of Amsterdam he referred
This is an English translation, by the authors, of “Ta enoratika mathimatika kai i logiki tous,”
published in the Greek volume Stigmes kai Diarkeies, Ed. Anapolitanos, Nefeli 2009. All rights
to this translation remain with the authors.
Research partially supported by a grant from the European Common Fund and the Greek
Government (PYTHAGORAS II).
We want to thank Kostas Mavrommatis, Yiannis Moschovakis and Sifis Petrakis, who read
preliminary versions of the article and gave us their comments and suggestions.
1Brouwer’s contribution to the dispute over the foundations of mathematics made a strong
impression on all participants. In particular, his ideas strongly influenced those of his rival Hilbert,
as well as the work of Go¨del. For a full discussion of the history see [25].
2An English translation, from which the quotations in this section are taken, appears in [5].
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to his own philosophy as neo-intuitionism,3 but the vigor and creativity Brouwer
brought to the subject over almost half a century of work have linked his name,
more than any other, with intuitionistic philosophy and mathematics. Many of the
basic principles of his intuitionism were already clear in his dissertation.
In direct opposition to Russell and Whitehead’s logicism, Brouwer asserted in
1907 that mathematics cannot be considered a part of logic. “Strictly speaking
the construction of intuitive mathematics in itself is an action and not a science;
it only becomes a science, i.e. a totality of causal sequences, repeatable in time,
in a mathematics of the second order [metamathematics], which consists of the
mathematical consideration of mathematics or of the language of mathematics...
But there, as in the case of theoretical logic, we are concerned with an application
of mathematics, that is, with an experimental science” ([5] p. 61).4
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries showed, according to Brouwer, that
Kant was only partly right in asserting that the intuitions of space and time are
logically prior to (and independent of) experience. “...we can call a priori only
that one thing which is common to all mathematics and is . . . sufficient to build up
all mathematics, namely the intuition of the many-oneness, the basic intuition of
mathematics. And since in this intuition we become conscious of time as change
per se, we can state: the only a priori element in science is time” ([5] p. 61).
Hilbert’s formalist program was doomed to failure because “language ... is a
means ... for the communication of mathematics but ... has nothing to do with
mathematics” and is not essential for it. Moreover, the “... existence of a mathe-
matical system satisfying a set of axioms can never be proved from the consistency
of the logical system based on those axioms,” but only by construction. “A fortiori
it is not certain that any mathematical problem can either be solved or proved to
be unsolvable” ([5] p. 79).
According to Brouwer, the paradoxes in set theory arise from the consideration of
sets which are too large and abstract to be built up mathematically. Even Cantor’s
second number class (of the denumerably infinite ordinals) cannot exist, although
the concept is consistent. Zermelo’s proof of the wellordering principle from the ax-
iom of choice is misguided. The continuum cannot be well-ordered, “firstly because
the greater part of the elements of the continuum must be considered as unknown,
and ... secondly because every well-ordered set is denumerable” ([5] pp. 84-85).
At the end of the dissertation, as the second of twenty-one “STATEMENTS (to
be defended together with the thesis),” Brouwer asserts: “It is not only impos-
sible to prove the admissibility of complete induction, but it ought neither to be
considered as a special axiom nor as a special intuitive truth. Complete induction
is an act of mathematical construction, justified simply by the basic intuition of
mathematics” ([5] p. 98). This statement effectively dismisses the work of Peano,
but admits a potential infinity of natural numbers with a method for showing that
arbitrarily complicated properties (even those involving quantification over all nat-
ural numbers) hold for each. In this context Brouwer’s earlier remark that “all
or every . . . tacitly involves the restriction: insofar as belonging to a mathematical
structure which is supposed to be constructed beforehand” ([5] p. 76) suggests that
3“Intuitionism and Formalism,” an English translation of this address, appeared in the Bulletin
of the American Mathematical Society in the same year, and is included in [1].
4Within quotations all words in [ ] are ours, but the italics are Brouwer’s own.
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the structure of the natural numbers can be understood as a completed construction
even though the collection of all natural numbers cannot be surveyed at a glance.
2. Intuitionistic Logic
One year after his dissertation, in “The unreliability of the logical principles,”
Brouwer argued against the use of classical logic in mathematics and science. He
agreed with the principles of syllogism (if all A’s are B, and all B’s are C, then all
A’s are C) and contradiction (nothing is both A and not A), but not with the law of
excluded middle (everything is A or not A) when it is applied to infinite systems.5
In effect, Brouwer distinguished between the intuitionistically unacceptable A∨¬A
and the intuitionistically correct ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A) , making full use of the expressive
power of the logical language to separate constructions which establish facts from
constructions which establish consistency.6
Considering Brouwer’s attitude toward formal logic, it is hardly surprising that
he did not attempt to axiomatize intuitionistic reasoning. Nevertheless, he recog-
nized the usefulness of formulating general principles which could be relied on for
mathematical constructions. It is this which legitimizes formal systems for intu-
itionistic logic and mathematics, as long as each axiom and rule can be justified
from an intuitionistic standpoint. As Kleene remarks on page 5 of [30], Brouwer’s
objection was only to formal reasoning without a corresponding (mathematical)
meaning.
In 1925 Andrei Kolmogorov [32] proposed axioms for (minimal) intuitionistic rea-
soning with implication and negation only; his article, in Russian, attracted little
or no attention in western Europe. Formal systems for intuitionistic propositional
logic were published (in French) by Valerii Glivenko in 1928 ([15]) and 1929 ([16]).
The first was incomplete. The second included two additional axioms suggested by
Brouwer’s student Arend Heyting, who presented his own detailed axiomatizations
of intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic and a part of intuitionistic math-
ematics in three classic papers [19], [20], [21] the following year.7 Heyting began
with the caveat
“Intuitionistic mathematics is a mental process, and every lan-
guage, the formalistic one included, is an aid to communication
only. It is in principle impossible to construct a system of formulas
equivalent to intuitionistic mathematics, since the possibilities of
5[6] pp. 109-110. In fact, Brouwer asserted, “. . . the question of the validity of the principium
tertii exclusi is equivalent to the question whether unsolvable mathematical problems can exist.
There is not a shred of a proof for the conviction, which has sometimes been put forward, that
there exist no unsolvable mathematical problems.” We shall return to this question in Sections 3
and 4.
6D. Hesseling ([25] p.280) credits A. Kolmogorov [33] with the observation that for Brouwer
a statement of the form ¬B was positive existential: “there exists a chain of logical inferences,
starting with the assumption that [B] is correct and concluding with a contradiction” . By the
same reasoning, ¬¬B asserts the consistency of B.
7Glivenko’s 1929 note and the first part of Heyting’s axiomatization were recently translated
from the original French and German into English for the collection [36].
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thinking cannot be reduced to a finite number of rules constructed
in advance.”8
Nevertheless, the effort to explain in metamathematical terms the difference
between intuitionistic and classical logic made sense, because Brouwer’s theory of
the continuum contradicted classical logic.
In order to be acceptable intuitionistically, a general logical principle must be
uniformly interpretable by means of constructions (proofs or computations). Kol-
mogorov’s problem interpretation, and Heyting’s association of assertions with their
(constructively acceptable) proofs, are special cases of what has become known as
the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov explication of the intuitionistic connectives and
quantifiers.
Like Tarski’s truth definition, the B-H-K interpretation is heuristic rather than
mathematically precise, and is based on the assumption that true prime statements
justify themselves. An implication can only be justified by a construction which
uniformly converts any given justification of the hypothesis to a justification of the
conclusion. A disjunction is justified by a construction which chooses a particular
one of the disjuncts and provides its justification. The negation of a statement is
justified by a construction which would convert any justification of the statement
into a proof of a known contradiction. The intuitionistic objections to the classical
laws of excluded middle and double negation can be explained on the basis of this
interpretation.
Beginning around 1940 the American logician S. C. Kleene, who was sympathetic
to intuitionistic ideas, devoted considerable effort to clarifying their precise relation
to classical logic and mathematics.9 The Hilbert-style formalisms for intuitionistic
logic and arithmetic we present here are from Kleene [29] (p. 82), with minor
changes in symbols and numbering. They represent an independent selection among
many axioms proposed earlier by Kolmogorov, Glivenko, Heyting and Peano.
2.1. The intuitionistic propositional calculus Pp. The first step in the meta-
mathematical study of any part of logic or mathematics is to specify a formal
language. For propositional or sentential logic, the standard language has denu-
merably many distinct proposition letters P0,P1,P2, . . . and symbols &, ∨, →, ¬
for the propositional connectives “and,” “or,” “if . . . then,” and “not” respectively,
with left and right parentheses (, ) (sometimes written “[, ]” for ease of reading).
Classical logic actually needs only two connectives (since classical ∨ and → can be
defined in terms of & and ¬), but the four intuitionistic connectives are indepen-
dent. The classical language is thus properly contained in the intuitionistic, which
is more expressive.
The most important tool of metamathematics is generalized induction, a method
Brouwer endorsed. The class of (well-formed ) formulas of the language of Pp is
defined inductively by
8An authoritative and readable summary of Heyting’s contributions to the subject is A. S.
Troelstra’s [45], from which this smooth English translation of the introduction to Heyting [19] is
borrowed.
9 Kleene was inspired by a remark of Hilbert and Bernays to consider “∃xA(x),” for example,
as “an incomplete communication, which is completed by giving an x such that A(x) together
with the further information required to complete the communication ‘A(x)’ for that x.” This
interpretation led to recursive realizability; see §5.
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(i) Each proposition letter is a (prime ) formula.
(ii) If A, B are formulas so are (A & B), (A ∨ B), (A→ B) and (¬A).
(iii) Nothing is a formula except as required by (i) and (ii).
As in classical logic, (A↔ B) abbreviates ((A→ B) & (B→ A)). Inessential paren-
theses are omitted on the convention that ¬ binds closer than &, ∨ which bind closer
than →.
The building blocks for Kleene’s version of intuitionistic propositional logic Pp
are finitely many axiom schemas, each summarizing a potentially infinite collec-
tion of intuitionistically correct formulas, and one rule of inference expressing an
intuitionistically acceptable principle of reasoning from hypotheses to a conclusion.
The axioms are all formulas of the following forms:10
X1. A→ (B→ A).
X2. (A→ B)→ ((A→ (B→ C))→ (A→ C)).
X3. A→ (B→ A & B).
X4. A & B→ A.
X5. A & B→ B.
X6. A→ A ∨ B.
X7. B→ A ∨ B.
X8. (A→ C)→ ((B→ C)→ (A ∨ B→ C)).
X9. (A→ B)→ ((A→ ¬B)→ ¬A).
X10. ¬A→ (A→ B).
The rule of inference of Pp is
R1 (Modus Ponens). From A and A→ B, conclude B.
A formal proof in Pp is any finite sequence E1, . . . ,Ek of formulas, each of which
is an axiom or an immediate consequence, by the rule of inference, of two preceding
formulas of the sequence.11 Any proof is said to prove its last formula, which is
therefore a theorem of Pp. We write ⊢Pp E to denote that E is a theorem of Pp.
Example. Here is a complete formal proof (really a proof schema, as A may be
any formula) in Pp of ¬(A & ¬A), indicating the reasons for each step.
(1) (A & ¬A)→ A. [axiom by X4]
(2) (A & ¬A)→ ¬A. [axiom by X5]
(3) ((A & ¬A)→ A)→ (((A & ¬A)→ ¬A)→ ¬(A & ¬A)). [axiom by X9]
(4) ((A & ¬A)→ ¬A)→ ¬(A & ¬A). [by R1 from (1), (3)]
(5) ¬(A & ¬A). [by R1 from (2), (4)]
If Γ is any collection of formulas and E1, . . . ,Ek any finite sequence of formulas
each of which is a member of Γ, an axiom, or an immediate consequence by R1 of
two preceding formulas, then E1, . . . ,Ek is a derivation in Pp of its last formula Ek
from the assumptions Γ. We write Γ ⊢Pp E to denote that such a derivation exists
with Ek = E. The following theorem is proved by induction over the definition of
a derivation; its converse follows from R1.
10Glivenko’s original axiom system consisted of X4 - X9 and variants of X2, X3. In [16] he
added X1 and X10, which he attributed to Heyting. Heyting [19] had X1, X6, X9, X10 and
variants of X2 and X8 as axioms but otherwise & and ∨ were treated differently. Heyting showed
that his axioms are independent and do not prove ¬¬A → A. Kleene’s version of X2 was designed
to simplify the proof of the Deduction Theorem.
11This and similar descriptions abbreviate the obvious inductive definitions.
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The Deduction Theorem. If Γ is any collection of formulas and A,B are any
formulas such that Γ ∪ {A} ⊢Pp B, then also Γ ⊢Pp (A→ B).
The axiomatization is designed so that classical propositional logic Ppc results
from Pp by strengthening the axiom schema X10 to
X10c. ¬¬A→ A.
The definitions of proof and derivation for Ppc are like those for Pp but with X1-
X10c instead of X1-X10. To show that Pp is a subtheory of Ppc it suffices to prove
⊢Ppc X10, a relatively simple exercise.
In 1929 Glivenko [16] proved that if A is any formula such that ⊢Ppc A , then
⊢Pp ¬¬A . This simple form holds only for propositional logic, and is known as
“Glivenko’s Theorem.”
Around 1933 Kurt Go¨del [17] and Gerhard Gentzen (published posthumously
in [14]) observed independently that Ppc can be faithfully translated into Pp.12
Briefly, each proposition letter is replaced by its double negation, and then ∨ is
replaced inductively by its classical definition in terms of ¬ and &. If Γg,Ag are
the translations of Γ,A respectively then
(i) ⊢Ppc (Ag ↔ A), and
(ii) Γg ⊢Pp A
g if and only if Γ ⊢Ppc A.
In 1934-35 Gentzen [13] proved a normal form theorem for an intuitionistic se-
quent calculus, giving an effective algorithm for deciding whether an arbitrary for-
mula A is or is not provable in Pp. Since intuitionistic propositional logic has no
finite truth-table interpretation, the decision algorithm for Pp is more complicated
than for Ppc.
2.2. The intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus Pd. The pure first-
order language has individual variables a1, a2, a3, . . ., and countably infinitely many
distinct predicate letters P1(. . .),P2(. . .),P3(. . .), . . . of arity n for each n = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
including the 0-ary proposition letters. There are two new logical symbols ∀ (“for
all”) and ∃ (“there exists”).
The terms of the language of Pd are the individual variables. The formulas are
defined by
(i) If P(. . .) is an n-ary predicate letter and t1, . . . , tn are terms then P(t1, . . . , tn)
is a (prime) formula.
(ii) If A, B are formulas so are (A & B), (A ∨ B), (A→ B) and (¬A).
(iii) If A is a formula and x an individual variable, then (∀xA) and (∃xA) are
formulas.
(iv) Nothing else is a formula.
We use x, y, z,w, x1, y1, . . . and A,B,C, . . . ,A(x),A(x, y), . . . as metavariables for
variables and formulas, respectively. Anticipating applications (e.g. to arithmetic),
s, t, s1, t1, . . . vary over terms. In omitting parentheses, ∀x and ∃x are treated like ¬.
The scope of a quantifier, and free and bound occurrences of a variable in a formula,
are defined as usual. A formula in which every variable is bound is a sentence or
closed formula.
12In 1925 Kolmogorov [32] published a different negative translation for a fragment with →
and ¬ only.
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If x is a variable, t a term, and A(x) a formula which may or may not contain
x free, then A(t) denotes the result of substituting an occurrence of t for each free
occurrence of x in A(x). The substitution is free if no free occurrence in t of any
variable becomes bound in A(t); in this case we say t is free for x in A(x).13
In addition to X1 - X10, Pd has two new axiom schemas, where A(x) may be
any formula and t any term free for x in A(x):
X11. ∀xA(x)→ A(t).
X12. A(t)→ ∃xA(x).
In addition to R1, Pd has two new rules of inference:
R2. From C→ A(x) where x does not occur free in C, conclude C→ ∀xA(x).
R3. From A(x)→ C where x does not occur free in C, conclude ∃xA(x)→ C.
A deduction (or derivation) in Pd of a formula E from a collection Γ of assump-
tion formulas is a finite sequence of formulas, each of which is an axiom by X1 - X12,
or a member of Γ, or follows immediately by R1, R2 or R3 from one or two formulas
occurring earlier in the sequence. A proof is a deduction from no assumptions.
If Γ is a collection of sentences and E a formula, the notation Γ ⊢Pd E means
that a deduction of E from Γ exists. If Γ is a collection of formulas, we write
Γ ⊢Pd E only if there is a deduction of E from Γ in which neither R2 nor R3 is used
with respect to any variable free in Γ. With this restriction, the deduction theorem
extends to Pd: If Γ ∪ {A} ⊢Pd B then Γ ⊢Pd (A→ B).
Example. Here is a deduction in Pd of ∃xA(x) from ∀xA(x) without using R2
or R3:
(1) ∀xA(x)→ A(x). [axiom by X11, with x free for x in A(x)]
(2) ∀xA(x). [hypothesis]
(3) A(x). [by R1 from (1) and (2)]
(4) A(x)→ ∃xA(x). [axiom by X12, with x free for x in A(x)]
(5) ∃xA(x). [by R1 from (3) and (4)]
Then ⊢Pd ∀xA(x)→ ∃xA(x) follows by the deduction theorem.
Classical predicate logic Pdc comes from Pd by strengthening X10 to X10c. The
negative interpretation extends to predicate logic using the classical definition of ∃
in terms of ∀ and ¬. The difference between constructive and classical proofs of
existence is starkly illustrated by the strong existence and disjunction properties of
Pd:
• If ⊢Pd ∃xA(x) where no variable other than x is free in A(x), then ⊢Pd A(x)
and hence ⊢Pd ∀xA(x).
• If ⊢Pd ∀x[A(x) ∨ B(x)] where no variable other than x is free in A(x) or
B(x), then ⊢Pd ∀xA(x) or ⊢Pd ∀xB(x).
2.3. Intuitionistic Predicate Logic with Equality Pd[=]. To be useful for
mathematics, the formal language must contain a binary predicate constant · = ·
denoting equality. If s, t are any terms then s = t is a prime formula in which all
the variables free in s or t are free. Every prime formula of the language of Pd is
13It matters which formula was originally designated by the notation A(x), since if x, y are
distinct and both occur free in A(x) then the sequence of free substitutions x 7→ y 7→ x results in
a formula different from A(x).
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also prime in Pd[=], and the formulas are built up from the prime formulas using
&,∨,→,¬, ∀ and ∃ as before.
The axioms of Pd[=] are all formulas of the extended language of the forms X1
- X12, together with the following equality axioms, where x, y and z are distinct
variables and A(x) may be any prime formula of the language of Pd in which y is
free for x.
XE1. x = y→ (x = z→ y = z).
XE2. x = x.
XE3. x = y→ (A(x)→ A(y)).
The rules of inference are R1 - R3 extended to the new language. The replacement
property of equality holds: If A(x) is any formula, and x and y are variables such
that y is free for x in A(x) and does not occur free in A(x) (unless y is x), then
⊢Pd[=] x = y→ (A(x)↔ A(y)).
The axioms guarantee that = is an equivalence relation but do not prove that = is
decidable or even stable under double negation, since 6⊢Pd[=] ¬¬(x = y)→ (x = y).
14
A typical mathematical application will have individual constants and function
symbols, with an appropriate definition of term, and all prime formulas will be
equations. Then the equality axioms for the function constants will take the place
of XE3, and XE2 may follow from the mathematical axioms.
3. Intuitionistic Arithmetic HA
Heyting [20] first axiomatized intuitionistic arithmetic, which is called “Heyting
arithmetic” in his honor.15 Kleene’s version [29] (p. 82) of HA has constants and
axioms for zero, successor, addition and multiplication, and the unrestricted axiom
schema of mathematical induction.
3.1. Heyting arithmetic and Peano arithmetic. The language of HA is an
applied version of the language of Pd[=], with no predicate letters, but with an
individual constant 0 and function constants ′, + and · . Terms are defined induc-
tively:
(i) 0 is a term.
(ii) Each individual variable is a term.
(iii) If s is a term, so is (s′).
(iv) If s and t are terms, so are (s + t) and (s · t).
(v) Nothing is a term except as required by (i) - (iv).
The prime formulas are the expressions of the form (s = t) where s and t are terms.
Formulas are built up from these as usual, omitting parentheses on the convention
that ′ binds closer than +, ·. Every occurrence of an individual variable in a term
t is free in t (and in every prime formula containing t). A term or formula without
free variables is closed.
14Heyting [20] introduced three distinct symbols to express three kinds of equality relations:
[intensional] identity, mathematical identity, and defined equality. For arithmetic all three notions
coincide, and number-theoretic equality is decidable. Equality of choice sequences, to be discussed
in the section on Brouwer’s continuum, is defined extensionally and is stable under double negation
but undecidable.
15J. van Oosten [41] points out that the formalizations of HA as a subtheory of Peano arith-
metic owe as much to Go¨del [17] and to Kleene [29] as to Heyting. Hesseling [25] observes that
Go¨del used Herbrand’s axioms.
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The axioms of HA are the schemas X1 - X12 for the language of arithmetic,
the equality axiom XE1, the axiom schema of mathematical induction for arbitrary
formulas A(x):
XInd. A(0) & ∀x(A(x)→ A(x′))→ ∀xA(x),
and the additional axioms for the primitive recursive function constants:
XN1. x = y→ x′ = y′ .
XN2. x′ = y′ → x = y .
XN3. ¬(x′ = 0) .
XN4. x + 0 = x .
XN5. x + (y′) = (x + y)′ .
XN6. x · 0 = 0 .
XN7. x · (y′) = (x · y) + x .
The rules of inference ofHA are R1 - R3 for the language of arithmetic. Deriva-
tions and proofs are defined inductively as usual, and Γ ⊢HA E means that a deriva-
tion in HA of E from Γ exists in which neither R2 nor R3 is used with respect to
a variable free in Γ.
The construction of the (standard) natural numbers generates a name or nu-
meral for each, thus 0′′ is the numeral for 2. Each closed term t of the language
expresses (under the intended interpretation) a particular natural number; if t is
the corresponding numeral then ⊢HA t = t. The natural numbers are discrete:
• ⊢HA (x = y) ∨ ¬(x = y) .
• ⊢HA ¬¬(x = y)→ (x = y) .
• ⊢HA (x = 0) ∨ ∃y(x = y′).
Classical Peano arithmetic PA comes from HA by strengthening X10 to X10c.
Go¨del [17] extended the negative translation to PA, reducing the consistency of
PA to that of HA and showing that HA cannot prove its own consistency.
Kleene’s proofs in [29] of Go¨del’s first and second incompleteness theorems apply
to HA as well as to PA. The arithmetization of metamathematics was carried out
in the intuitionistic subsystem, so every primitive recursive predicate can be numer-
alwise expressed in HA by a decidable formula. If T(e, x,w) is such a formula nu-
meralwise expressing “w is the go¨del number of a computation of {e}(x),” and A(x)
is ∃zT(x, x, z), then 6⊢HA ¬¬∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) and so HA + ¬∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x))
is consistent.16 This is a special case of the remarkable fact that intuitionistic arith-
metic is consistent with a classically false form of Church’s Thesis, as we are about
to see.
3.2. Kleene’s recursive realizability for intuitionistic arithmetic. The ori-
gin and development of recursive realizability are delightfully recounted by Jaap
van Oosten in [41]. Stephen Kleene, a student of Alonzo Church, took seriously
Hilbert and Bernays’ assertion in [24] that “a statement of the form ‘there exists
a number n with property A(n)’ is . . . an incomplete rendering of a more precisely
determined proposition, which consists either in directly giving a number n with
the property A(n), or providing a procedure by which such a number can be found
. . . .” Kleene generalized this idea to interpret every compound sentence of intu-
itionistic arithmetic as an incomplete communication of an effective procedure by
16To show ¬E is consistent with an intuitionistic system one must show that ¬¬E (not just
E) is unprovable.
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which its correctness might be established, and then applied Church’s Thesis to
identify “effective” with “recursive.” The result was 1945-realizability or number-
realizability.17
For the inductive definition, n and m range over natural numbers, and (n)i is
the exponent of the ith prime in the complete prime factorization of n (counting
2 as the 0th prime, and setting (0)i = 0 by convention. Ordered pairs are coded
by (n,m) = 2n · 3m, and {n}(m) denotes the result of applying the nth recursive
partial function to the argument m.
Definition. (Kleene 1945) A number n realizes a sentence E only as follows:
(1) n realizes a closed prime formula r = t, if r = t is true under the intended
interpretation.
(2) n realizes A & B, if (n)0 realizes A and (n)1 realizes B.
(3) n realizes A ∨ B, if either (n)0 = 0 and (n)1 realizes A, or (n)0 6= 0 and
(n)1 realizes B.
(4) n realizes A→ B, if, for every m: if m realizes A then {n}(m) is defined
and realizes B.
(5) n realizes ¬A, if no m realizes A.
(6) n realizes ∀xA(x), if, for every m: {n}(m) is defined and realizes A(m).
(7) n realizes ∃xA(x), if (n)1 realizes A(m) where m = (n)0.
A formula E is realizable if some n realizes the universal closure ∀E of E.
Kleene conjectured that every closed theorem of HA was realizable. His student
David Nelson verified the conjecture, then formalized the proof in an extension of
HA.18 The key lemma states that for each closed term t expressing the number
corresponding to the numeral t:
n realizes A(t) ⇔ n realizes A(t).
Nelson’s Theorem. If C1, . . . ,Ck ⊢HA A and C1, . . . ,Ck are realizable, so is A.
Corollary 1. If ⊢HA ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃yA(x1, . . . , xn, y) where A(x1, . . . , xn, y) con-
tains free only x1, . . . , xn, y then there is a general recursive function ψ of n variables
such that for all values of x1, . . . , xn: If ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = y, then A(x1, . . . ,xn,y)
is realizable.
In [28] Kleene observed that the cases of the definition for ∨, → and ∃ could be
modified to give another notion (later called realizable- ⊢) for which the analogue
of Nelson’s Theorem held, with the following result.19
Corollary 2 (to the version of Nelson’s Theorem for “realizable-⊢”). Assum-
ing ⊢HA ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃yA(x1, . . . , xn, y) where A(x1, . . . , xn, y) contains free only
x1, . . . , xn, y, there is a general recursive function ψ such that for all values of
x1, . . . , xn:
⊢HA A(x1, . . . ,xn,y) where ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = y.
17Kolmogorov [33] had earlier proposed a “problem interpretation” of the intuitionistic con-
nectives, but had not connected it with recursive functions.
18The technical work of formalization, in [40], was nontrivial. Kleene [28] announced and
interpreted Nelson’s results. For a comprehensive and comprehensible modern treatment, see
Troelstra [48].
19The existence and disjunction properties for HA were implicit special cases, as Kleene later
noted.
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3.3. Church’s Thesis. It is possible to express Church’s Thesis in the language
of arithmetic. One version (which includes countable choice) is the schema CT0:
∀x∃yA(x, y)→ ∃e∀x∃w[T(e, x,w) & A(x,U(w))]
where T(e, x,w) (numeralwise) expresses “w is the go¨del number of a computa-
tion of {e}(x),” and A(x,U(w)) abbreviates ∀z(U(w, z)→ A(x, z)) where U(w, z)
(numeralwise) expresses “z is the value, if any, computed by the computation with
go¨del number w; otherwise z = 0”. The go¨del numbering is primitive recursive, and
T(e, x,w) and U(w, z) are quantifier-free.20 Nelson’s Theorem entails the following
consistency and independence results.
Corollary 3. HA + CT0 is consistent.
Corollary 4. If A(x) is ∃yT(x, x, y) and B(x) is A(x) ∨ ¬A(x), then
(i) 6⊢HA ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)),
(ii) 6⊢HA ¬¬∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)), and
(iii 6⊢HA ∀x¬¬B(x)→ ¬¬∀xB(x).
While HA is a subsystem of PA, HA + CT0 is a nonclassical arithmetic. To see
why, let A(x, y) be (y = 0→ ∀z¬T(x, x, z)) & (y 6= 0→ T(x, x, y−˙1)). Evidently
⊢PA ∀x∃yA(x, y). In HA the hypothesis ∀x∃w[T(e, x,w) & A(x,U(w))] implies
∃w[T(e, e,w) & A(e,U(w)], but ⊢HA ∀w[T(e, e,w)→ A(e,w + 1)] and the go¨del
numbering satisfies ⊢HA ∀w(U(w) ≤ w) and ⊢HA ∀u∀v[A(e, u) & A(e, v)→ u = v].
Hence ⊢HA ¬∃e∀x∃w[T(e, x,w) & A(x,U(w))], so PA proves the negation of an
instance of CT0.
3.4. Axiomatization and modifications. When formalizing the original defi-
nition, Nelson associated with each formula A of HA another formula e r A of
(a conservative extension of) HA, then proved that every formula of the form
A↔ ∃e(e r A) was realizable and hence consistent with HA. In 1971 Troelstra
used an extension ECT0 of Church’s Thesis CT0 to determine the exact strength of
number-realizability over intuitionistic arithmetic.21 Briefly, Troelstra showed that
the provable sentences of HA + ECT0 are exactly those whose realizability can be
established in HA, and that ⊢HA+ECT0 (E↔ ∃x(x r E)) for every formula E.
From the intuitionistic point of view Church’s Thesis is restrictive, and probably
unacceptable as a general principle. Markov’s Principle MP, the schema
∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x))→ [¬∀x¬A(x)→ ∃xA(x)],
is also problematic. Because MP implies its own realizability, Troelstra’s theorem
extends over HA + MP to HA + ECT0 + MP.
22 Kreisel [34] invented a typed
version of realizability in order to show the independence of Markov’s Principle.
Other modifications of realizability have been developed to prove a variety of
independence and consistency results, and this process continues. The original
notion gives a classically comprehensible interpretation of Heyting arithmetic but
does not claim to capture intuitionistic arithmetical truth.
20For details including the definition of numeralwise expressibility see [29].
21ECT0 is the schema ∀x[A(x) → ∃yB(x, y)] → ∃e∀x[A(x) → ∃w(T(e, x,w) & B(x,U(w)))],
where A(x) is almost negative (containing no ∨, and no ∃ except immediately in front of a prime
or quantifier-free formula); every formula e r A is of this kind.
22Troelstra has convincingly argued that the “Russian recursive mathematics” of the Markov
school is based on this theory.
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4. The intuitionistic theory of the continuum
Brouwer’s main objection to classical mathematics (apart from the unrestricted
use of the principle of excluded middle) was “its introduction and description of
the continuum.”23 His entire work was motivated by the attempt to describe a
construction of the continuum in harmony with his mathematical principles, and
to develop a satisfactory mathematics on the basis of that construction.24 To
achieve this goal he created the new notions which give intuitionistic mathematics
its unique character.
Our idea of the continuum, the real plane or in the one-dimensional case the
real line, seems to originate from our perception of space, a primary notion which
is a priori according to Kant. Thus, until non-Euclidean geometries appeared and
the uniqueness of Euclidean space was lost, the continuum could be considered an
initial concept, immediately comprehensible by intuition, not requiring analysis in
terms of other more elementary concepts. After this loss, however, mathematicians
began trying to define the continuum from apparently more fundamental notions,
by more and more abstract methods. It was the era of Cantor’s creation of the
theory of sets, with the ordinal and cardinal numbers, and of the arithmetization
of analysis by Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor and others.
Since then, in traditional classical mathematics the continuum is considered
to be a collection of distinct mathematical objects, the real numbers, which are
defined using Dedekind cuts or Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, or nested
sequences of intervals with rational endpoints. In each case, infinite mathematical
entities are treated as completed, actual. Even the (semi)intuitionists Poincare´,
Borel and Lebesgue, in their treatment of the continuum, failed to maintain the
constructivist standpoint. Brouwer criticized them for having “recourse to logical
axioms of existence” such as the axiom of completeness, or “[contenting] themselves
with an ever-denumerable and ever-unfinished” ([11] p. 5) set of numbers so that,
in order to retain constructivity, they were restricted to definable and hence to only
countably many objects (for example, definable sequences of rationals).25
Brouwer accepted as correct Cantor’s argument showing that it is impossible
to enumerate all the points of the continuum. His first answer to the resulting
foundational problem was presented in his dissertation, where he considered the
continuum as a primitive entity, “the inseparable complement of the discrete,” to
which it cannot be reduced:
“However, the continuum as a whole was given to us by intuition; a
construction for it, an action which would create from the mathe-
matical intuition ‘all’ its points as individuals, is inconceivable and
impossible” because the “mathematical intuition is unable to create
other than denumerable sets of individuals.” ([5] p. 45)
According to its intuitive conception, the continuum can be infinitely divided: two
discrete points are connected by a “between”, which is never exhausted by the
insertion of new points. So it is possible “after having created a scale of ordertype
23Changes in the Relation between Classical Logic and Mathematics, in [43] p. 453.
24As Beth says ([2] p. 422), “the central theme in intutionistic mathematics is the theory of
the continuum.”
25In addition to the problem of cardinality, the measure of a countable set of reals is zero, and
that problem also concerned Brouwer from the beginning.
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[the ordertype of the rationals] to superimpose upon it a continuum as a whole”
([5], p. 45). Of course, this description of the manner in which we appear to pass
from the rationals with their dense linear order to the continuum does not give
a construction of the continuum, it simply indicates the relationship between the
rationals and the continuum and perhaps differs little from the acceptance of an
axiom of completeness, since the gaps between the rational points are covered by
their (rather indefinite) “between.” In any case the intuitionistic construction of
the continuum remained a challenge for Brouwer; his answer to that problem was
given later and stands as his most important creation.
Among various thoughts concerning the continuum, in his doctoral thesis Brouwer
presented arguments for the continuum hypothesis, i.e. the conjecture that Can-
tor’s second number class and the continuum have the same number of points: this
holds primarily, in Brouwer’s early opinion, because considering the continuum as
a set of points we are obliged to define its points somehow, and therefore a set of
the same cardinality as the second number class results.26
Thus, in Brouwer’s thought as expressed in his dissertation, the continuum had
an intuitive basis very close to its geometrical representation, like that of the semi-
intuitionists. A constructive arithmetical (in the sense of being based in some
way on some notion of number) view of the continuum was impossible, and so its
mathematical treatment remained problematic.
In his lectures of his mature period, Brouwer gave to his first, essentially restric-
tive intervention in the problems of foundations of mathematics the name “First
Act of Intuitionism.”27 With it he completely separated language and logic from
mathematics and ruled that the intuition of many-oneness is the only basis for
mathematical activity - as he had already stated in his dissertation. He recognized
however the restricted possibilities of mathematical development (only “separable”
mathematics like arithmetic and algebra survived): “Since the continuum appears
to remain outside its scope, one might fear at this stage that in intuitionism would
be no place for analysis.” ([11], p. 7). And then he presented the “Second Act of
Intuitionism,”28 with which he introduced his new notions of free choice sequences
and species and began the intuitionistic reconstruction of analysis.
26Indeed Brouwer notes that the problem has not been well posed, because “neither the second
number class nor the continuum as a totality of individualized points exists mathematically” ([5],
p. 83).
27The First Act of Intuitionism. The complete separation of mathematics from mathematical
language, and hence from the linguistic phenomena which are described by theoretical logic, the
recognition that intuitionistic mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind which
springs from the perception of a motion of time. This perception of time can be described as the
splitting of a life moment into two distinct things, one of which gives place to the other, but is
preserved in memory. If the dyad thus born is stripped of every quality, what remains is the blank
form of the common substratum of all dyads. And it is this common substratum, this common
form, which is the basic intuition of mathematics. ([11], p. 4)
28The Second Act of Intuitionism. The adoption of two ways of creating new mathematical
entities: first in the form of infinite sequences of mathematical entities which have already been
constructed, which continue more or less freely (so that, for example, infinite decimal fractions
which neither have exact values nor are guaranteed to ever acquire exact values are allowed);
second, in the form of mathematical species, that is properties which are supposed to hold of
mathematical entities which have already been constructed, which satisfy the condition that if
they hold for a mathematical entity, they also hold for all the mathematical entities which have
been determined to be ‘equal’ to it, where the definitions of equality must satisfy the conditions
of symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity. ([11], p. 8)
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4.1. Brouwerian set theory.
4.1.1. Choice sequences. As we have seen, the role of infinite sequences is crucial
in an arithmetical description of the continuum. Borel had remarked that the only
way to obtain the continuum using only sequences of rationals without imposing the
existence of real numbers by means of axioms, was to adopt sequences of arbitrary
choices of objects. As a constructivist he hesitated but did not completely reject
the idea:
“...one knows that the completely arithmetical concept of the con-
tinuum requires that one admits the legitimacy of a countable in-
finity of successive choices. This legitimacy seems to me highly
debatable, but nevertheless one should distinguish between this le-
gitimacy and the legitimacy of an uncountable infinity....The latter
concept seems to me ... entirely meaningless...” ([3] and [50] volume
2, p. 641).
Brouwer, with his Second Act of Intuitionism, accepted free choice sequences as
legitimate mathematical objects.29 As we shall see, he found a way to use these
infinite, undetermined objects constructively by viewing them as having two parts:
a finite, already constructed part which permits genuine constructive use of the
infinite sequence under some circumstances, and an infinite, undetermined part
which makes it possible to obtain the whole continuum, escaping the restrictions
imposed by any sort of definability.
4.1.2. The new notions of set. Brouwer’s new perspective on the foundations of
mathematics was presented in his 1918 article “Foundation of Set Theory, indepen-
dent of the logical law of excluded middle. First part: General Set Theory.” [8].
There, instead of Cantor’s sets, two alternative notions are proposed as the basis
for analysis, the spread (Menge)30 and species.
Species: the set as property. Species are in fact closely related to sets as under-
stood in classical mathematics. A species is a property, but a property “supposable
for mathematical entities previously acquired”, and is extensional with respect to
the notion of equality (in general an equivalence relation) between the mathemati-
cal objects in question. The verification that a mathematical object has a property
(hence “belongs to the species”) requires a construction; the species therefore may
be thought of as a construction within a construction. Two species are the same “if
to every element of each an equal element of the other can be correlated.” With this
definition of species, the problems of impredicativity and self reference are avoided:
“a species can be an element of another species, but never an element of itself!” as
Brouwer himself asserts ([11], p. 8).
Spread: the set as law. But apart from the natural numbers, which mathematical
entities can be elements of species? The generation of mathematical objects results
from mathematical activity typically involving the radically new concept of spread,
where free choice sequences are allowed. Each element of a spread is constructed in
29This acceptance reflected his opinion, inspired by Kant, that mathematical constructions are
internal, free creations of the mind of the creating subject, a view which influenced his methodology.
30Brouwer initially used the term Menge, which had been preempted by Cantor, but later
preferred the term spread. In the Greek version of this article we translated “spread” using an
ancient Greek word for loom, following the example of Wim Veldman (possibly the unique modern
mathematician who works precisely in the spirit of Brouwer).
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stages: at each stage we choose, in accordance with certain rules, one more piece
of the element, thus obtaining a better approximation of it. Specifically:
A spread is created i) by successive choices of natural numbers; each choice de-
pends on the preceding ones, and is made either freely or in accordance with certain
restrictions, and ii) by assigning after each choice an object from a particular pre-
existing denumerable set. The restrictions in i) and the correlations in ii) are given
by the spreadlaw, in reality a pair of laws, the choice law (which also determines
whether the process will terminate or be continued, and in the second case there
must be at least one permitted choice for the next step)31 and the correlation law.
Attempting to describe the nature of the ‘laws’, Brouwer notes: “...we can say that
a spread law yields an instruction32 according to which ...” ([11], p. 15).
The elements of the spread are the sequences (infinite or finite) of the objects
correlated to each sequence of choices. So an element may remain forever incom-
plete, always becoming. The spread thus created is not considered to be the totality
of its elements, but is identified with the law of its creation. The description of
the notion of spread is complicated and long, but Brouwer said he could not avoid
this complexity. Over time he made various modifications to the details of the
definition, concerning for example the nature of the restrictions imposed.
Despite the fact that every choice and subsequent assignment is made effectively
and so it is decidable whether a given finite sequences of choices or of objects to be
assigned is permitted, the same is not true for the infinite sequences: a free choice
sequence is constructed in steps; if at some step the choice law determines that the
finite part which has already been created no longer satisfies the restrictions, then
indeed we know that the sequence does not ‘belong’ to the spread. But as long as
it satisfies the restrictions, we can never be sure that it will not be rejected at some
later step, and that is the price of freedom in the creation of the sequence.
Spreads are more basic objects than species: the spread generates its elements,
while the species has elements already constructed, and what is needed for a math-
ematical entity to belong to a species is the intuitionistic justification that it has
the property which defines the species.
4.1.3. Spreads as trees with a topology. We can think of spreads as trees, whose
nodes are the finite sequences of correlated objects corresponding to the successive
choices, and all of whose branches are infinite (a branch is a sequence each of whose
finite initial segments belongs to the tree). Brouwer himself used this image in
describing spreads.
In a very natural way a topology can be defined on a spread: considering the
infinite branches (using the tree image) as points and taking as basis for the topology
the set Nu, where Nu is the set of the infinite branches with initial segment u.
4.1.4. Examples. Now we give two most important examples of spreads.
1. The universal spread, whose choice law permits the choice of any natural
number whatsoever at each step, and whose correlation law assigns trivially after
each choice the number just chosen. This spread gives us all the sequences of natural
numbers, so the species of its elements is uncountable. Equipped with the initial
segment topology, it becomes the familiar Baire space, and so it is Borel-isomorphic
31This means that we can assume that only infinite sequences are produced by the spread law.
32Italics ours.
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(isomorphic as a measure space) to the set R of the traditional real numbers; it
is (topologically) homeomorphic with the irrational numbers. This most general
and free process associated with the universal spread captures the essence of the
creation of the intuitionistic continuum, and on this basis, by placing a few minor
restrictions, we can define the real numbers in the context of intuitionism.
2. A finitely branching spread is called a fan. Fans, which are compact in
the above topology, play a special role in the development of a theory of analysis
because of their more determinate character. One fan of particular significance is
the binary fan, consisting of all infinite sequences of 0s and 1s, which with the initial
segment topology is the well-known Cantor space.
The intuitionistic continum and the real numbers are the next examples, to which
we now turn.
4.2. The intuitionistic continuum.
4.2.1. The spread of the points of the continuum and the real numbers. Let us
consider33 the species of the binary fractions a/2n, where a is an integer and n a
natural number, with the usual ordering. In this species, we consider the closed
intervals of the form Im,n = [m/2
n, (m + 2)/2n] and an enumeration of the pairs
of natural numbers p1, p2, ... with pi =< ri, si >, and the following spread: at the
first step the choice of any natural number n is permitted and the interval Irn,sn is
assigned; if a1, ..., an have been chosen and the interval Ir,s has been assigned, then
it is permissible to choose the number k only if Irk,sk is properly contained in Ir,s,
and if k is chosen then the interval Irk,sk is assigned. The elements of this spread,
these infinitely proceeding sequences of closed intervals whose lengths converge to
0, are the points of the continuum.34
An equivalence relation is now defined for these points: two points p and q
coincide if every interval of p intersects every interval of q. Each equivalence class
is a species called a point core and this is what a real number is defined to be.
The species of all these point cores is the intuitionistic continuum. The equality
between reals is obtained from the coincidence relation: if r and s are reals and p, q
representatives of r, s correspondingly, then r = s if and only if p and q coincide.
Brouwer gave many analogous constructions of the continuum, using for example
sequences of rationals or binary fractions with various rates of convergence. Heyting
also gave some constructions of this kind, using the characteristic term real number
generators for the corresponding point cores. This description of the real numbers
solves the problems of cardinality and measure from an intuitionistic standpoint.
For example, the rationals are naturally embedded into the reals defined as above,
since every rational belongs to a sequence of intervals Im,n with lengths tending to
0. But the differences from the real numbers of classical mathematics remain large,
as will appear in what follows.
4.2.2. Undecidability of equality. In his 1930 paper titled “The structure of the con-
tinuum” [10] Brouwer examined basic properties of the continuum, comparing the
classical continuum with the one resulting from his own views. His first conclusion
33From the footnote of Parsons in [9].
34We can compare this process with the nested interval principle, a completeness axiom which
assures that the intersection of every sequence of nonempty closed nested intervals whose lengths
converge to 0 is nonempty.
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was that equality between two real numbers is undecidable in the case of the in-
tuitionistic continuum. We can see this as follows: Let A(n) be a property which
is decidable for each n, for example the Goldbach conjecture (every even number
greater than 3 is the sum of two primes), so that A(n) is the property that 2n+ 4
is the sum of two primes. Let
α(n) =
{
1/2n, if ∀k ≤ n A(k),
1/2k, if ¬A(k) & k ≤ n & ∀m < k A(m).
The sequence of rationals so defined is evidently convergent, hence determines a
real number r. We see that r = 0 if and only if A(n) holds for every n (otherwise
r = 1/2k for the least k for which A(k) fails). So we cannot decide if r coincides
with 0, as long as we do not know the answer to Goldbach’s conjecture.
4.2.3. Weak counterexamples. Counterexamples of the type just considered are
characteristic of Brouwer’s argumentation, and are known as weak counterexam-
ples. Each one uses a problem which has not yet been solved in order to deny a
classically valid statement. It is weak because it depends crucially on a specific
unsolved problem, to which a solution may someday be found; for instance, many
of Brouwer’s weak counterexamples involved Fermat’s Last Theorem, which was
then undecided but has now been proved.
But Brouwer believed that there would always be unsolved mathematical prob-
lems. A weak counterexample can be considered as a construction which will convert
any unsolved problem into a refutation of a classical theorem. Implicit in the use
of weak counterexamples is Brouwer’s continuity principle, to be explained below.
4.2.4. The continuum cannot be ordered. A second result was the impossibility of
finding a linear order of the intuitionistic continuum. The rationals are obviously
totally ordered, because the comparison of rationals reduces to the comparison of
natural numbers. For the reals, some can certainly be compared and ordered among
themselves; in the characterization by nested intervals for example, if at some step
of the construction of two points of the continuum p and q an interval of p lies
entirely to the left of an interval of q, then, for the corresponding reals r and s we
have r < s. Thus the natural order of the reals, as Brouwer called it, is derived.
But again by appealing to weak counterexamples, he showed that this order cannot
be total. Then he defined a refinement of the natural order, the virtual order
r ≺ s ≡ ¬r > s & r 6= s,
which also fails to be total. It is worth noting that, although from the intuition-
istic standpoint not all real numbers are comparable, the natural ordering can be
proved to satisfy certain properties; the most useful substitute for comparability is
the property r < s → r < t ∨ t < s. The lack of order is not a “technical” prob-
lem, but rather a consequence of the fact that most real numbers are incompletely
determined objects.
4.2.5. The unit continuum. Because two real numbers r and s are not always com-
parable with respect to the natural ordering, the closed interval [r, s] is defined to
be the species of all reals x for which it is impossible that x > r and x > s, and
also impossible that x < r and x < s. If r < s then [r, s] is just the species of x
such that neither x < r nor x > s. The proof of the uniform continuity theorem,
discussed below, depends on the fact that any closed interval [r, s] is the continuous
image of a fan F of real number generators, each of which coincides with a point
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of [r, s]. By the unit continuum Brouwer meant a fan coordinated in this way with
[0, 1] (as in [11] p. 35; cf. [50] and [35]).
4.3. The basic theorems and implicit principles.
4.3.1. Discontinuous functions do not exist. The undecidability of equality has con-
sequences which a traditional mathematician would find hard to accept. Let35 f
be the function from the reals to the reals with
f(x) =
{
1 if x 6= 0,
0 otherwise,
which is classically defined everywhere and discontinuous at 0. Intuitionistically
however, f cannot be a total function: for the real number r of the weak counterex-
ample we gave, as for any other real, it follows by continuity (in the usual sense)
that we can calculate any approximation to f(r), and from the presumed totality
of the function we can decide whether f(r) < 1 or f(r) > 0, and so decide whether
¬r 6= 0 or r 6= 0, or equivalently36 whether r = 0 or r 6= 0, which is impossible;
thus we arrive at the conclusion that f cannot be a total function.
Another impressive result obtained by similar arguments is that the Intermediate
Value Theorem fails intuitionistically.
4.3.2. The uniform continuity theorem. In contrast with these negative results,
Brouwer reached a very strong conclusion, similar to the classical theorem that
functions continuous on a compact space are uniformly continuous, except that in
the intuitionistic case only continuous functions exist:
Uniform continuity theorem. Every total function defined on the unit continuum
is uniformly continuous.
In fact Brouwer probably arrived at this result guided by his intuition rather
than by clear mathematical arguments. Hermann Weyl said the following in one of
his lectures, defending Brouwer’s continuum: “It is clear that no one can explain the
meaning of ‘continuous function on a bounded interval’ without including ‘uniform
continuity’ and boundedness in the definition. Above all, there can be no function
on a continuum other than continuous functions.” (citeVS1990, p. 379). Brouwer
read and emphatically agreed with these remarks. For many years he tried to find a
satisfactory proof for this theorem. In his 1927 article “On the domains of definition
of functions” [9] the most complete presentation of his arguments is given. The
value of this attempt consists mainly in the fact that in his proof, especially in its
final form, the two characteristic principles of intuitionistic analysis (which we will
discuss below) are used clearly and thus brought to light, though not explicitly as
principles but only as natural manifestations of the intitionistic viewpoint.
4.3.3. The Fan Theorem. The uniform continuity theorem was obtained as a con-
sequence of the fan theorem, as Brouwer called it.
The Fan Theorem. If to each element α of a fan a number bα is associated, then
a natural number z can be found so that bα is determined completely by the first
z values of α.
35The example is from [50], volume 1, p. 14.
36The equivalence of ¬r 6= 0 with r = 0 needs a little argument. The equality r = 0 is of the
form ∀n A(n), and the A(n) is decidable hence stable under double negation, while the implication
¬¬∀nA(n)→ ∀n¬¬A(n) holds intuitionistically.
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This version of the theorem fails classically; its proof uses the (classically cor-
rect) method of backwards induction but also the (classically false) intuitionistic
continuity principle37. It is the form which Brouwer preferred.
A different version of the theorem is provable just using the principle of back-
wards induction and is classically correct. In this version, the theorem says that if,
for the given fan there is a decidable set B of nodes such that each branch α meets
B (such a B is called a bar), then there is a number z such that each branch meets
the bar at a node of length at most z. We mention this alternative because it is
classically equivalent to Ko¨nig’s Lemma (every infinite, finitely branching tree has
an infinite branch).
As van Dalen notes in [12], “it is an interesting historical curiosity that the fan
theorem preceded its much better known contrapositive: Ko¨nig’s infinitary lemma
[Ko¨nig 1926] ... The infinitary lemma is not constructively valid. An interesting
observation is that this contradicts the popular impression that constructive proofs
and theorems are always later improvements of classical theorems.”
4.3.4. The Bar Theorem. In order to prove the fan theorem Brouwer first gave a
complicated proof, more or less metamathematical in character, of what he later
called the bar theorem, in which he examined the structure of possible proofs of
sentences of certain forms. Later however, as appears in a footnote to his 1927
article [9], he realized that what he uses is in fact a kind of induction principle. A
statement of this principle follows:
Bar Theorem. Let the universal spread contain a decidable bar A and X be a
set of nodes satisfying (i) A ⊂ X and (ii) if all the immediate successors of a node
n belong to X , then n belongs to X ; then it follows that the empty sequence (the
root of the universal spread) belongs to X .
We remark that this principle makes it possible to exploit properties possessed
by all sequences of natural numbers, despite their incomplete character, in the case
where these properties can be verified at some finite stage of the generating process
of the sequence. But in any case the assumption of the existence of a bar on the
universal spread is not at all trivial; to see this, we need only observe that the
set of nodes where each branch meets the bar for the first time may be as “long”
as any infinite countable ordinal number. While this principle seems to be closely
connected with intuitionistic mathematics, it also happens to be classically correct.
4.3.5. The continuity principle. When Brouwer proved that the universal spread
generates uncountably many elements, he replaced Cantor’s diagonal argument by
a new argument of exceptional simplicity, as follows: suppose we have a function
from the universal spread to the natural numbers, and let b be the value this function
takes on the sequence α. Constructively, this b must be determined by the first y
values of α, for some y. But then the function must also take the value b on a
sequence β having the same first y terms as α, although β(y+1) 6= α(y+1). Hence
it is impossible to map the universal spread to the natural numbers in a one-to-one
way, and so the elements of the universal spread cannot be enumerated.
The substance of this argument is the continuity principle, which played a crucial
role in the proofs of several theorems considered above. According to this principle,
37The principles mentioned here will be defined below.
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in order for a function to be defined on a spread, the value it takes on each sequence-
argument must be determined entirely by an initial segment of the sequence. This
is how the conflict between the incompletely determined nature of choice sequences,
and the constructive character of a function defined over them, was reconciled by
Brouwer. So the principle postulates that every total function is continuous. It
can also be generalized to functions with sequence values. It is the only genuinely
intuitionistic principle of Brouwer’s mathematics, it contradicts classical analysis,
and thus the mathematics based on it are distinct from, in fact inconsistent with,
classical mathematics.
4.3.6. Other mathematical principles. It is certain that Brouwer saw the general
axiom of choice as eminently nonconstructive. However various arithmetical forms
of it result by correct reasoning from the manner in which existential and universal
statements are understood intuitionistically. We will discuss these in the context
of a formal system which was proposed for Brouwer’s analysis.
4.4. FIM: a formal system for intuitionistic analysis. The axiomatization
of intuitionistic mathematics by Heyting in his classic work [19, 20, 21] included the
theory of sets, but in a form which, as Kleene observes, did not facilitate its com-
parison with classical mathematics. Kleene and Vesley’s book “The Foundations
of Intuitionistic Mathematics” [30], which was published in 1965, was the result of
many years’ research. It presented a formal system FIM for a part of intuition-
istic mathematics including Brouwer’s set theory restricted to definable properties
of numbers and sequences, sometimes referred to as intuitionistic analysis.38 The
language he uses is identical with that of a formal system for classical analysis.
However, in contrast to intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic and Heyting
arithmetic, intuitionistic analysis is not a subsystem of the classical theory, but a
divergent theory of analysis, as would be expected from the discussion above. How-
ever, FIM contains a subsystem, the basic system B, consisting of the common
part of classical and intuitionistic analysis. When X10c (the principle of double
negation) is added to B the result is a corresponding system for classical analysis,
while the intuitionistic system FIM comes from B by adding one axiom expressing
the classically false continuity principle.
The language of FIM is a two-sorted first order language with equality, suitable
for a formal theory of natural numbers and choice sequences (functions from ω to
ω); we shall see that it can also express continuous functionals. There are two
types of individual variables, arithmetical variables a,b,c,. . . , x,y,a, . . . and function
variables α, β, γ, . . ., and finitely many function constants f0, . . . , f24, expressing
zero, successor, addition and multiplication, as well as other primitive recursive
functions such as predecessor, remainder and quotient; each fi expresses a function
of ki number and li function arguments, respectively. This choice is not unique, it
was intended by Kleene to simplify the development of the theory.39 In addition,
the symbols of the language include Church’s λ.
38Kleene himself referred to this part as “two-sorted intuitionistic number theory.”
39The complete catalog of function constants can be found in [30]. In the spirit of Brouwer it
is open, allowing additions as required by the development of the theory; thus, in [31] two more
function constants are proposed.
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In addition to the terms, which are the formal expressions ofFIM for the natural
numbers, in this system there are formal expressions, called functors, for (total)
functions from ω to ω. The two notions are defined by simultaneous induction:
(i) The number variables are terms.
(ii) The function variables are functors.
(iii) For every i = 0, . . . , 24, if ki = 1 and li = 0, then fi is a functor.
(iv) For every i = 0, . . . , 24, if t1, . . . , tki are terms and u1, . . . , uli are func-
tors, then fi(t1, . . . , tki , u1, . . . , uli) is a term.
(v) If u is a functor and t is a term, then (u)(t) is a term.
(vi) If x is a number variable and t is a term, then λx t is a functor.
(vii) An expression is a term or functor if and only if that follows from (i)– (vi).
The atomic or prime formulas are expressions of the form s = t where s and t are
terms. Equality between functors is not prime, but is defined by
u = v ≡ ∀x (u(x) = v(x)),
where x does not appear free in u, v. The formulas are formed as usual, with
the difference that here the quantifiers may apply to function variables, so that
∀A, ∃A are formulas.
The free and bound occurrences of variables are defined as usual, except that
Church’s λ symbol also binds number variables.
The axiom schemas and rules of inference of the system include first of all X1 -
X12 and R1 - R3 (for the language of FIM) as well as the following, where u is a
functor free for α in A(α) and α does not occur free in C:
X13. ∀ A() → A(u).
X14. A(u) → ∃A().
R4. From C → A(), conclude C → ∀ A().
R5. From A() → C, conclude ∃ A() → C.
The equality axioms 1 - 3 and the arithmetical axioms Ind and 1 - 7 are also
included, where of course x, y, z are number variables. The axioms concerning
functors are first of all the definitions of the function constants f0, . . . , f24, which
are formulas expressing the corresponding explicit or recursive definitions, as well
as:
XF1. (λx r(x))(t) = r(t).
XF2. a = b→ (a) = (b).
XF3. ∀x ∃A(x, )→ ∃∀xA(x, λy (2x · 3y)),
where r(x), t are terms, x is a number variable, t is free for x in r(x), and (x, )
is a formula in which x is free for .
XF1 is the β-reduction axiom of the -calculus; XF3 is a principle of countable
choice which is acceptable according to the intuitionistic interpretation of the quan-
tifiers.
For the description and treatment of choice sequences in FIM we use sequence
numbers, which code initial segments of sequences of natural numbers as follows:
the first x values of a sequence α are given by α(x), where
α(0) = 1 and α(x+ 1) = p
α(0)+1
0 · . . . · p
α(x)+1
x ,
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where p0, p1, . . . are the prime numbers in their natural order. This coding, as well
as the formal predicate Seq(a) expressing that a codes a finite sequence, can be
defined in the formal system. So can the operation a ∗ b = a ·
∏
i<lh(b) p
(b)i
lh(a)+i
40
of concatenation. With these tools it becomes possible to formulate in FIM the
characteristic principles of Brouwer’s mathematics concerning choice sequences.
The mathematical principle which Brouwer tried to convey by the bar theorem
is introduced in FIM by the Axiom of Backwards Induction (Bar Induction):
BI : ∀a [ Seq(a)→ R(a) ∨ ¬R(a) ] & ∀ ∃xR((x)) &
∀a [ Seq(a) & R(a)→ A(a) ] &
∀a [ Seq(a) & ∀s A(a ∗ 2s+1)→ A(a) ]
→ A(1).
About Kleene’s choice of this schema we can say the following:
The properties of choice sequences which are interesting from the intuitionistic view-
point are those which are verifiable on the basis of some initial part of each choice
sequence, that is they are of the form ∃xR(α(x)), where R(a) is an arithmetical
predicate, decidable at least for sequence numbers. BI expresses the following in-
duction principle for spreads (trees) on which there is a (decidable) bar: if (i) A(a)
is a property which is possessed by sequence numbers having the property R(a)
and (ii) A(a) is transmitted41 recursively, in the sense that for every sequence
number a, if (a∗2s+1) holds for every s, then also A(a) holds, then we conclude
that A(1) holds, where 1 is the code of the empty sequence.
R(a) plays the role of the bar; this form of the axiom only takes care of the case of
the universal spread, but the notion of spread is definable in FIM and the general
form is provable from this.
The important Fan Theorem, formally stated, is proved in FIM using BI.
BI is provable classically (and without the restriction of decidability of R(a),
which is meaningless in this case); together with the preceding axioms and rules, it
completes the basic system B.
The next and final axiom expresses the classically false continuity principle. For
the formulation of this principle in FIM Kleene points out that Brouwer himself,
speaking about the assignment of a value b to a function α, used the expression “the
algorithm of the correlation law”. Taking this expresssion seriously and arguing as
follows:
first, the algorithm for computing the value b must (i) decide, for each initial
segment α(0), . . . , α(y − 1) of a choice sequence α, whether these values suffice for
the computation of b; (ii) if the answer is “yes,” compute b, and
second, this information must be given by a function τ , which acts on sequence
numbers α(y) and produces 0 as long as the algorithm does not answer “yes,” while
if y is the least number for which the answer is “yes” then τ(α(y)) = b+1 (and we
may assume without loss of generality that this is the only y for which τ(α(y)) > 0),
Kleene proposed the following formal statement of the continuity principle (Brouwer’s
principle):
40Here lh(a) expresses the length of the sequence coded by a, and (a)i its i
th projection.
41In the direction from the bar toward the root of the tree, hence the name backwards induction.
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BP : ∀ ∃A(,)→ ∃∀ [∀t∃!y (2t+1 ∗ (y)) > 0 &
∀ [∀t∃y (2t+1 ∗ (y)) = (t) + 1→ A(,) ] ].
This principle is false for classical mathematics. For example, in [30] it is used
to prove
⊢ ¬∀(∀x (x) = 0 ∨ ¬∀x (x) = 0)
(from which it follows that equality between choice sequences must be undecidable),
and the negation of the universal closure of the least number principle.
In addition, the third chapter of [30] contains R. E. Vesley’s presentation of the
intuitionistic theory of the continuum in the context of the formal system FIM.
Real numbers are defined by formalizating the notion of real number generator and
the uniform continuity theorem is proved. In the fourth and last chapter, Kleene
treats formally the question of the order of the reals. Thus an important part of
Brouwer’s mathematics is faithfully represented in this formal system.
4.5. Function realizability interpretation of the system FIM. In the same
book, by adapting the basic idea of number realizability, Kleene gives an inter-
pretation of intuitionistic analysis which guarantees the consistency of the formal
system. Here we have propositions of the form ∃β A(β), where β is a function
variable; to interpret and justify such a proposition requires a function β and a
verification that the interpretation of A(β) is correct. Now the suitable candidates
for realizing objects are not natural numbers, but number-theoretic functions of one
(number) variable. The basic mechanism Kleene used, in analogy with the coding
of recursive functions by natural numbers, is the coding of (continuous) functionals
F : ωω → ωω by means of functions τ : ω → ω. Thus he defined the partial
recursive function {τ}[α] of two function variables τ and α, which computes the
functional coded by τ at the argument α.
The definition of function realizability is recursive and is motivated by the pre-
vious discussion.42 The concept to be defined is
ǫ r E : ǫ realizes E with respect to ,
where ǫ : ω → ω, E is a formula, is a list of variables containing all those
occurring free in E, and is an assignment of numbers and (one-place) number
theoretic functions to the variables of .43
1. ǫ r P, where P is prime ⇐⇒df P is true for ,
that is, P holds for the values assigns to the variables of . RP
2. ǫ r A & B ⇐⇒df (ǫ)0 r A and (ǫ)1 r B. &R
3. ǫ r A ∨ B ⇐⇒df if (ǫ(0))0 = 0 then (ǫ)1 r A and
if (ǫ(0))0 6= 0 then (ǫ)1 r B. ∨R
4. ǫ r A→ B ⇐⇒df for every α (: ω → ω), if α r A then
{ǫ}[α]↓ and {ǫ}[α] r B. →R
5. ǫ r ¬A ⇐⇒df for every α, it is not the case that α r A
(equivalently, if and only if ǫ r (A→ 1 = 0),
because of 4 and 1: there is no α such that ¬R
α r 1=0, where 1=0 is a false
42It also uses the definitions (ǫ)i = t (ǫ(t))i for i = 0,1, and {ǫ}[x] = {ǫ}[t x].
43We read ↓ as “is defined”.
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prime formula).
6. ǫ r ∀xA ⇐⇒df for every x (∈ ω), {ǫ}[x]↓ and
{ǫ}[x] r, x A, where x is the value of x. ∀NR
7. ǫ r ∃xA ⇐⇒df (ǫ)1 r, (ǫ(0))0 A, where (ǫ(0))0
is the value of x. ∃NR
8. ǫ r ∀A ⇐⇒df for every α, {ǫ}[α]↓ and {ǫ}[α] r, α A,
where α is the value of . ∀FR
9. ǫ r ∃A ⇐⇒df {(ǫ)0}↓ and (ǫ)1 r,{(ǫ)0} A,
where {(ǫ)0} is the value of . ∃FR
A closed formula E is realizable, if it is realized by some general recursive
function ǫ : ω → ω. An open formula is realizable, if its universal closure is.
The appropriate soundness theorem holds:
Theorem. (Kleene). Let be a (finite) list of formulas and a formula. Then, if
⊢FIM and the formulas of are realizable, it follows that E is realizable.
Corollary. The formal system FIM is consistent.
Completing the presentation of function realizability, Kleene made the conjecture
that, with the formalization of this notion and of the (model theoretic) proof of
the consistency of FIM, a metamathematical proof of the relative consistency
of FIM with respect to the basic system B would be obtained. In 1969, in his
monograph “Formalized recursive functionals and formalized realizability” [?], he
presented a detailed formalization of the theory of recursive functions of type 2 and
the corresponding formal notion of function realizability44 as well as a variation
which made it possible to prove his conjecture, and also to prove the disjunction
and existence properties and a form of Church’s thesis, for FIM.
Corollary. (i) If ⊢FIM A ∨ B where A ∨ B is a closed formula, then one of the
following holds: ⊢FIM A or ⊢FIM B.
(ii) If ⊢FIM ∃xA(x) where ∃xA(x) is a closed formula, then, for some natural
number x, ⊢FIM A(x), where x is the numeral for x.
(iii) If ⊢FIM ∃A() where ∃A() is a closed formula, then ⊢FIM ∃GR()A(), where
GR() is a formula (with only free) expressing that the function represented by is
general recursive.
In 1973 Troelstra characterized function realizability using the schema GC1, a
generalization of the continuity principle BP.45
4.6. Relativized and modified realizabilities. Kleene relativized his original
function-realizability interpretation in various ways. If Φ is a class of number-
theoretic functions closed under “recursive in” then for Θ,Ψ ⊆ Φ and ε ∈ Φ the
notion “ε Φ/realizes-Ψ E” is defined like “ε realizes-Ψ E” except that in Clauses
4, 5 and 8 the α is restricted to Φ.
Then E is Φ/realizable/Θ if for some ε recursive in Θ: ε Φ/realizes ∀E. The
soundness theorem extends to the relativized notions. Using his example of a binary
fan all of whose recursive branches (but not all of whose branches) are finite, and
44As in the arithmetical case, what is involved is a translation, by which to each formula E
there corresponds a formula ε r E.
45GC1 is the schema ∀(A() → ∃B(, ))→ ∃∀(A() → ∃({σ}[] = & B(, ))), where A is an almost
negative formula.
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taking Φ = Θ to be the class of all general recursive functions, Kleene showed that
Brouwer could not have proved his “Bar Theorem” without using bar induction in
the proof.
Theorem. (Kleene) The axiom schema of bar induction is independent of the
other axioms of intuitionistic analysis. If the “fan theorem” replaces the bar induc-
tion schema, then it too is independent of the other axioms.46
Next he took Φ = Θ to be the class Ξ of all arithmetical functions, which is
(classically) closed under general recursiveness and the jump operation, and proved
(classically) that the fan theorem and all axioms of the intuitionistic system except
bar induction are Ξ/realizable/Ξ . (Later, Howard and Kreisel [26] proved that
bar induction actually changes intuitionistic arithmetic; Troelstra [46] proved that
the fan theorem does not.)
Kreisel [34] first suggested a different kind of modification of realizability (later
adapted by Kleene) in order to prove Markov’s Principle independent of the in-
tuitionistic axioms. Kreisel and Kleene used explicit types, but the same effect is
obtained using implicit types via a notion of agreement. Van Oosten [41] explains
the main idea: “Each formula gets two sets of realizers, the actual realizers being a
subset of the potential ones.”
For example, ε agrees with A→ B if, whenever σ agrees with A, {ε}[σ] is defined
and agrees with B. If F is a collection of functions closed under “general recursive
in” and the free variables of A→ B are interpreted by numbers and functions from
F, then ε Frealizes A→ B under this interpretation of the variables if ε ∈ F and ε
agrees with A→ B and for every σ ∈ F: if σ Frealizes A under the interpretation
then {ε}[σ] Frealizes B under the interpretation.
The proof that bar induction is Frealizable is a little more complicated than for
realizability. The critical observation is that if σ Frealizes ∀α∃!xR(α(x)), then
{σ}[ϕ] is defined for every ϕ by agreement, and ({σ}[ϕ](0))0 = x depends only on
a finite initial segment of ϕ. But every neighborhood of ϕ contains elements of F,
and the assumption on σ implies (by a roundabout argument) that if ψ(x) = ϕ(x)
and ψ ∈ F then ({σ}[ψ](0))0 = x also. This provides the basis for informal bar
induction.
For Kleene’s srealizability, F is the class of all functions. To see that Markov’s
Principle is not srealizable, assume σ srealizes ∀(¬∀x¬((x) = 0)→ ∃x((x) = 0)).
Then τ = {σ}[λt.1] Srealizes ¬∀x¬((x) = 0)→ ∃x((x) = 0) when is interpreted by
λt.1, and there is a recursive θ which agrees with the hypothesis, so ({τ}[θ](0))0 = x
is determined by λt.1(z) for some z. If ϕ(y) = 1 for y ≤ x+ z but ϕ(x+ z+1) = 0,
then θ srealizes the hypothesis ¬∀x¬((x) = 0) when is interpreted by ϕ, but {τ}[θ]
does not srealize the conclusion.
The relativized version was developed in [37] (for F the class of all recursive func-
tions) in order to prove ∀¬¬GR() consistent with the intuitionistic theory and with
Vesley’s Schema [42], which entails Brouwer’s creating subject counterexamples.
For other applications, first observe that ordinary function-realizability provides
a classical proof that the intuitionistic theory FIM is consistent with PA, since
46[30] Corollary 9.9. The circularity in Brouwer’s “proof” of his Bar Theorem is analyzed in
Chapter 6.
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classically every arithmetical instance of the law of excluded middle is realized by
some function.
If A(x) is any arithmetical predicate with only x free, let F[A(x)] be the col-
lection of all functions classically recursive in the intended interpretation of A(x).
Then both ∀¬¬∃e∃[∀x((x) = 0↔ A(x)) & ∀x∃y[T1(e, x, (y)) & U((y)) = (x)]] and
∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) are F[A(x)]realizable and hence consistent with FIM. Thus it is
possible to interpret the constructively undetermined part of the intuitionistic con-
tinuum as classically recursive in the constructively determined part, which could
include the characteristic functions of arbitrarily complicated arithmetical relations.
Of course, it is impossible to assign go¨del numbers (or even relative go¨del numbers)
continuously, so the ¬¬∃e cannot consistently be replaced by ∃e.
4.7. A glimpse at today and tomorrow. His philosophical ideas were Brouwer’s
motivation for the intuitionistic reconstruction of mathematics. However, in an
irony of history, the interest in intuitionistic thought (except among those holding
similar philosophical ideas) springs today mostly from logic and computer science.
The B-H-K interpretation found a precise implementation in Kleene’s notion of
realizability, which relates it to the theory of recursive functions; but also in connec-
tion with the proof systems of Gentzen, it led to the Curry-Howard isomorphism,
which correlates -terms and finally programs with proofs. The intuitionistic the-
ory of types of Per Martin-Lo¨f belongs in the same framework. The polymorphic
-calculus or system F of Girard and the logic of constructions of Coquand and
Huet (on which was based the functional language proof checker Coq, used recently
(2004) to verify the correctness of the solution to the 4 color problem), are appli-
cations of the preceding. A detailed description of the development and further
influence of these ideas appears in the article “From constructivism to computer
science” by A. S. Troelstra, [49].
Another source of interest is category theory, where it was discovered that im-
portant spaces such as topoi are models of intuitionistic logic. In the article [41] by
J. van Oosten one can find a sketch of this line of development of the theory.
Various logical and mathematical systems and semantics were developed in con-
nection with intuitionistic logic. As examples we mention Kripke semantics and
constructive versions of Zermelo - Fraenkel set theory, like those of J. Myhill and
P. Aczel; also the constructive development of a large part of analysis by E. Bishop
and his school, and the recursive constructive mathematics of the Russian school
associated with A. A. Markov.
In each case, intuitionistic mathematics constitutes a rich source of mathematical
ideas. These can either be developed within classical mathematics to produce
proper subtheories of particular classical theories, or be considered as extending
classical mathematics,47 offering different definitions and refinements of logical and
mathematical concepts, with all that this implies.
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